domingo, 30 de setembro de 2012

Mathias Risse: "On Global Justice"

Livro de Mathias Risse (Harvard) sobre justiça global e cosmopolitismo. Sua teoria, "internacionalismo pluralista", defende uma concepção de justiça global a partir da propriedade coletiva do planeta. Risse é famoso por seus trabalhos em modelos de barganha e como comentador de Nietzsche. 

Seguem links para dois artigos de Risse sobre o assunto, e uma parte do primeiro capítulo.


sexta-feira, 28 de setembro de 2012

Rushdie: How the fatwa changed a writer's life

Texto autobiografico de Salman Rushdie, publicado na The New Yorker, no qual o escritor conta com a vida dele, e as relações religiosas na Inglaterra, mudaram depois do "Rushdie Affair":

The Disappeared: how fatwa changed a writer's life

The author, photographed in London in 1994, five years after Ayatollah Khomeini

The book took more than four years to write. Afterward, when people tried to reduce it to an “insult,” he wanted to reply, “I can insult people a lot faster than that.” But it did not strike his opponents as strange that a serious writer should spend a tenth of his life creating something as crude as an insult. This was because they refused to see him as a serious writer. In order to attack him and his work, they had to paint him as a bad person, an apostate traitor, an unscrupulous seeker of fame and wealth, an opportunist who “attacked Islam” for his own personal gain. This was what was meant by the much repeated phrase “He did it on purpose.” Well, of course he had done it on purpose. How could one write a quarter of a million words by accident? The problem, as Bill Clinton might have said, was what one meant by “it.”

The ironic truth was that, after two novels that engaged directly with the public history of the Indian subcontinent, he saw this new book as a more personal exploration, a first attempt to create a work out of his own experience of migration and metamorphosis. To him, it was the least political of the three books. And the material derived from the origin story of Islam was, he thought, essentially respectful toward the Prophet of Islam, even admiring of him. It treated him as he always said he wanted to be treated, not as a divine figure (like the Christians’ “Son of God”) but as a man (“the Messenger”). It showed him as a man of his time, shaped by that time, and, as a leader, both subject to temptation and capable of overcoming it. “What kind of idea are you?” the novel asked the new religion, and suggested that an idea that refused to bend or compromise would, in all likelihood, be destroyed, but conceded that, in very rare instances, such ideas became the ones that changed the world. His Prophet flirted with compromise, then rejected it, and his unbending idea grew strong enough to bend history to its will.

When he was first accused of being offensive, he was truly perplexed. He thought he had made an artistic engagement with the phenomenon of revelation—an engagement from the point of view of an unbeliever, certainly, but a genuine one nonetheless. How could that be thought offensive? The thin-skinned years of rage-defined identity politics that followed taught him, and everyone else, the answer to that question.

terça-feira, 25 de setembro de 2012

Filosofia Política no século XXI

Steven Cahn (Columbia) e Robert Talisse (Vanberbilt) reuniram uma coleção de trabalhos de filosofia política contemporânea pela Westview Press. Entre os autores selecionados, Dworkin, Anderson, Tan e Pogge. Uma das intenções dos autores é ir além do debate "Rawls e seus críticos";

Political Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century

Political Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century

Moving beyond the work of Rawls and his critics, this concise collection contains critical essays in contemporary political philosophy. All have been chosen for their importance and accessibility, and some have been edited by their authors for inclusion in this work. The book covers five main topics: equality, justice, liberty, democracy, and human rights. To assist readers, the editors have also provided section introduction and study questions as well as an overall introduction explaining the background to contemporary work in political philosophy. Beginning where most other anthologies in political philosophy conclude, this book can be used alone or in conjunction with any collection of historical sources.


I. Equality
1. Ronald Dworkin, “Equality”
2. Elizabeth Anderson, “Democratic Equality”
3. Kok Chor Tan, “A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism"

II. Justice
4. G. A. Cohen “Rescuing Justice and Equality”
5. David Miller, “Justice and Boundaries” 
6. Amartya Sen, “Capabilities and Resources”

III. Liberty
7. Philip Pettit, “The Instability of Freedom as Non-Interference
8. John Christman, “Can Positive Freedom be Saved”
9. Ian Carter, “The Myth of ‘Merely Formal Freedom’” 

IV. Democracy
10. Richard Arneson, “Democracy is not Intrinsically Just
11. Thomas Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy” 
12. Joshua Cohen, “Reflections on Deliberative Democracy”

V. Human Rights
13. Onora O’Neill “The Dark Side of Human Rights
14. Thomas Pogge, “World Poverty and Human Rights”
15. Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Social Justice” 

sábado, 1 de setembro de 2012

Entrevista: Axel Honneth

Entrevista de Axel Honneth publicada originalmente em 2010, na qual o filósofo alemão procura definir a especificidade de sua concepção de crítica social frente as alternativas contemporâneas.


The other principle, which is more disputed, is the concept of contribution or social esteem. I believe this principle to be absolutely fundamental for our understanding of the whole sphere of work. The sphere of organized work is totally downplayed by the procedural theories of justice because of their narrow focus on political citizens. Therefore I want to readdress these other components. I should mention that, with this approach I am very close to another political philosopher; not Michael Walzer, who also writes about «spheres of justice», but David Miller, who, in his book Social Justice (1976), also plays with the idea that we have to deal with three different principles of justice. I call this approach a pluralistic approach. 

Pobreza e constitucionalismo em Rawls

Frank Michelman (Harvard Law School) publicou um artigo na SSRN colocando em questão o problema da pobreza para a teoria rawlsiana da legitimidade. De maneira mais geral, Michelman discute se devemos incorporar demandas sociais na teoria constitucional. 

Frank Michelman - Poverty in Political Liberalism: A comment on the constitutional essentials

Does a political culture’s embrace of liberal constitutionalism – or does liberal political thought more generally – come laden with a deep-seated resistance to recognition of the injustice of structural poverty within a broadly affluent society, or to getting done politically whatever is required in order to abolish that injustice? For those inclined to say so, the philosophy of John Rawls might seem to pose a testing case. In our time, Rawls’s philosophical excavations of liberalism are the ones we might well regard as the most dedicatedly antipoverty of all, and so his works would seemingly be the last place to go hunting for evidence of an ineluctable resistance in liberalism to the subjugation of poverty by political means. If we find such evidence there, where in liberalism will we not?

Rawls compiles a roster of “constitutional essentials,” meaning commitments that must be observable, in practice as well as in form, in the basic laws that constitute a country’s political and legal regime, in order to render that regime legitimate in the sense it can command morally the compliance of citizen with laws and policies that issue from it, regardless of disagreements about whether those laws and policies are truly compatible with the demands of justice. Now, Rawls decidedly and deliberately excludes from the constitutional essentials a guarantee to everyone of what he calls “fair” (as distinguished from merely “formal”) equality of opportunity – even though, in Rawls’s view, a regime that fails to satisfy fair equality of opportunity may for that very reason be gravely unjust.

This paper asks whether the Rawlsian exclusion of fair equality of opportunity from the constitutional essentials should be taken as a sign, even within the thought of Rawls, of the incapacity of liberal constitutionalism, with its prioritized commitment to individual rights and liberties, to grasp and respond fully to the injustice of avoidable structural poverty. The paper answers “no.” It finds that constitutionalization of fair equality of opportunity remains an open and debatable question within liberalism as conceived by Rawls, and furthermore that Rawls’s own reasons for deciding against constitutionalization contain nothing to detract from his insistence that fair equality of opportunity is a strict requirement of justice.